My dear parishioners,
Peace! In other bulletins (4 December, 2016-11 June, 2017) we have considered the teaching of the Catechism of the Catholic Church on “conscience.” We then turned to Saint John Paul II’s encyclical letter Veritatis splendor (6 August, 1993) which addresses fundamental moral issues, including “conscience” more than one hundred times. These reflections were begun earlier (6 April, 2018-30 May, 2018). Here we now consider a passage from Veritatis splendor, 59.2.
Saint John Paul II (+2005) when considering the “judgment of conscience” reminds us that “the judgment of conscience is a practical judgment, a judgment which makes known what man must do or not do, or which assesses an act already performed by him.” It is neither religiously rigid nor scrupulous to examine one’s conscience or to confess one’s sins. Interestingly enough Saint John Paul II never uses either of those terms (rigid, scrupulous) or their derivatives while teaching mortal truths in Veritatis Splendor. Surely, the Holy Father was not canonized in order to be forgotten.
By highlighting the judgment of conscience as a “practical judgment” the specter of a “speculative judgment” or “theoretical judgment” may arise. Speculative reasoning would be involved in any speculative judgements, considering hypothetical situations and variables and abstractions. Some examples of practical judgements might include looking both ways before crossing the street, testing the warmth of the baby’s bottle before giving it to a hungry child, taking an umbrella on a cloudy day… We have judged that it is good to not get run over, that the baby should not be burnt, that it is better to be dry than wet. We may further judge that the lull in traffic will allow our passage (or not), that hungry children should be fed, that it may rain. None of this is nefarious. On the contrary, prudence would be cast aside, or worse, were these judgements not considered.
Our friends at Meriam-Webster include the thought of Immanuel Kant (+1804) and Kantianism, when considering “practical reason” which is tied up in all of this. Practical reason is “concerned with the practical accomplishment of chosen ends” and “the action or office of reason in matters of the will, specifically, the determination of the grounds or universal laws of voluntary action by reason.” Practical judgement is preceded by practical reason recognizing universal laws, i.e. the Law of God, the Natural Law, written on our hearts (cf. Romans 2:15; Psalm 37:31). In Person and Act (2021: 267) the future John Paul II clarifies “the point is not in the least to confer a legislative power on conscience, as was postulated by Kant, who identified this power with the concept of autonomy, that is, the freedom of the person. Conscience is not the legislator; it does not create norms by itself. Rather, it finds them in a sense ready-made in the objective order of morality or law.” There are twenty-three references to Kant in Person and Act, not to mention the Lublin Lectures.
God bless you!
Father John Arthur Orr